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We investigate how the Japanese pension market for funded employment-based pensions is
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lifetime employment contracts. Recent legislation permitting the establishment of defined contribution
plans in Japan may provide new employer-sponsored retirement plan opportunities.  We first describe the
Japanese pension system at the end of the 20th century and provide an overview and evaluation of the
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modernized.  Finally we indicate lessons gleaned from recent changes in US pension plans.
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Strengthening Employment-Based Pensions in Japan  
 
Robert Clark and Olivia S Mitchell 
 
 
  The Japanese population is aging more rapidly than any other, and very low fertility rates going 
forward mean that this nation’s population will start shrinking within the next few years.
1   International 
retirement system experts would do well to examine developments in Japanese retirement policies, so as 
to assess how employer-sponsored pensions fare in such a rapidly aging society.  Demographic change in 
Japan also places pressure on plan sponsors to efficiently manage pension funds and to offer cost-
effective pensions that workers value.  Government policymakers must monitor and revise national 
pension systems and develop appropriate regulations and tax policies for employer pension plans.  
Coordination of public and private retirement programs will be essential in the coming decades.    
  Two important questions are addressed in the present analysis:  how is the Japanese pension 
market for funded employment-based pensions evolving, and what additional steps are needed to 
strengthen public and private retirement plans?  The Japanese pension system is one of the largest in the 
world, second only to that of the United States pension market.  Institutional public and employer pension 
assets in Japan have been estimated to be around US$3 trillion (Conrad 2001; Cerulli 1999), of which 
some US$0.6 trillion are in private plans (Sakamoto, 2001). But economic news has not been favorable 
for Japanese pension plans of late.  Financial stagnation has sharply reduced asset values, lowered returns 
on bonds and other fixed income assets, and raised unemployment rates.
2   In addition, the weak economy 
                                                 
1 Japan is currently the most rapidly aging country in the world.  This aging reflects a very low total fertility rate of 
approximately 1.3, and high life expectancy of 77 years for men and 84 years for women.  Projections indicate that 
the proportion of the population aged 65 and older will increase from about 15% in 1995 to 27% by 2025 and the 
absolute size of the Japanese population will begin to decline in the five years (Ministry of Health, Labor, and 
Welfare, 1999; Miyatake, 2000). 
2 For example, the index of the stock market (Nikkei 225 stock index) fell from just under 40,000 in the late 1980s 
to around 15,000  during the 1990s.  The unemployment rate rose from 2% at the beginning of the 1990s to 5.3 % in 
September 2001.  In addition, average land prices in Tokyo plummeted during this period and interest rates hover 
near zero.   2
is undermining firms’ commitment to traditional lifetime employment contracts as deferred compensation 
promises (Seike, 1997).  
  To modernize the pension environment in Japan, a number of regulatory changes were recently 
passed.  These changes, intended to restructure and provide new opportunities for employer-sponsored 
retirement plans, followed closely on the heels of modifications in the Japanese pay-as-you-go social 
security system which is made up by the Employees’ Pension Insurance and the National Pension, 
described in more detail below. Furthermore, publicly traded firms in Japan must now comply with new 
and more transparent accounting standards.  These standards will also shape pension restructuring, as 
firms are required to provide new information regarding retirement plan liabilities and assets.  To permit 
an assessment of these patterns, we begin with a review of the status of the Japanese pension system at the 
end of the twentieth century.  Our analysis considers changes in both public and private pension plans and 
how these programs are interrelated.  Next, we turn to a summary and evaluation of the major changes in 
the employer-provided pension arena emerging from the 2001 legislation.  We show that several 
important unanswered design questions still remain before Japanese employment-based pensions can be 
effectively modernized.  Additional regulations will be required before recently enacted reforms will fully 
achieve the objective of enhancing retirement security. We also discuss some of the lessons that might be 
gleaned from recent changes in pension plans in the United States. 
 
I.  The Japanese Pension System at the End of the Twentieth Century  
  There are about 67 million economically active persons in Japan.  Virtually all workers 
are included in the national social security system. In addition, about 39 million of these workers 
are covered by some form of employer-sponsored pension plan (Miyatake, 2000). This section 
explores how the Japanese retirement system works and outlines the major changes in Japanese 
retirement policy over the recent past. We trace potential employer as well as employee 
responses within the context of the current economic situation, population aging and broader   3
changes in human resource policies in Japan.  Employer pensions are developed within the 
framework of social security rules and benefits.  Changes in mandatory benefit programs, such as 
lower replacement rates and higher retirement ages, will influence employer and employee 
preferences concerning private retirement plans.  Thus, our analysis begins with a review of the 
continuing evolution of social security in Japan. 
A. An Overview of the Japanese Publicly-Provided Retirement Program 
  The Japanese national social security system is composed of two parts, both of which are mainly 
financed on a pay-as-you-basis (see Figure 1).  The first pillar is the National Pension (NP), which  
provides a flat benefit to all persons who contribute to the system.
3  The NP was established in 1959 to 
provide benefits to self-employed workers, farmers, their dependent spouses, the unemployed, and 
students.  These groups are required to make monthly contributions to the NP (¥13,300 per month in 
1999; US$111).
4     Since 1986, employed individuals and their spouses participate in the NP system 
through their own and their employer’s mandatory contributions to the Employees’ Pension Insurance 
(EPI).  Each year, the EPI system transfers to the NP account sufficient funds to pay for the flat benefit of 
covered employees and their spouses.
5  The NP flat benefit is equal to a specified quantity of yen per 
month, multiplied by the number of “covered” months (how long the worker contributed to the system).  
In 1999, a retiree with full benefit from the NP would receive a monthly benefit of ¥67,017 (US$558). 
Prior to the 1986 reform, the full NP benefit was payable at age 65 after 25 years of service; reduced 
benefits could also be taken as early as age 60, and the benefit amount could be increased if the worker 
                                                 
3 Prior to 1986, the National Pension covered only persons who were not included in the Employees’ Pension 
Insurance system.  Reforms introduced in 1986 expanded the NP to include participants in the EPI, and in essence, 
the NP became a universal retirement program (Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare, 1999). 
4 Throughout this paper, yen figures are converted to US dollars in 2001 at a rate of US$1=¥120.  
5 The amount of monies transferred by the EPI is determined every year by the number of insured employees paying 
into the EPI (aged 20 to 59 years) and the number of their dependent spouses (aged 20 to 59 years).   4
delayed acceptance until age 70 (Clark, 1991).
6  These benefits are indexed to the cost of living after 
retirement.   The 1986 reforms made a full benefit conditional on 40 years of contributions. 
Figure 1 here 
The second pillar of the Japanese public pension system takes the form of an earnings-related 
defined benefit plan called the Employees’ Pension Insurance (EPI) program.  The EPI was established in 
1941 to cover employed persons.  Prior to 1986, the EPI benefit formula was 1.0% of pay per year of 
service, linked after retirement to the cost of living index.  Subsequently, the benefit formula has been 
reduced to 0.75 times average indexed (or revalued) earnings, not including bonuses, times the number of 
covered years.  The reduction in the benefit formula was to be phased in over 20 years and the new lower 
level will apply to all persons born in 1946 or thereafter, reflecting the larger number of covered working 
years of younger cohorts.  Currently, the tax rate used to finance the EPI is 17.35% of covered earnings, 
divided equally between the employer and the employee.  This contribution is used to finance the flat NP 
benefit for the worker and his/her spouse plus the earnings-related EPI benefit described above. 
Using the current benefit formula, a worker with 40 years of coverage would receive an earnings-
related benefit of 30% of average real earnings.  The flat benefit for a married worker and spouse 
provides a total replacement rate of over 50% for most retirees.  For example, consider a retired employee 
with average earnings (approximately ¥340,000 or US$2,833 per month) who had 40 years of coverage 
and whose spouse was a full-time housewife.  This couple would receive a flat benefit of ¥67,017 
(US$558) per month for both the husband and the wife, or a total basic benefit of ¥134,000 (US$1,117) 
per month.  In addition, the retiree would receive ¥104,000 (US$866) per month from the earnings-related 
EPI benefit.  Thus, the combined publicly supported benefit for the family would be about ¥238,000 (or 
US$1,983; Miyatake, 2000).  Reforms implemented in 1994 gradually boosted the eligibility age for the 
NP flat benefit from age 60 to 65; however, eligibility for EPI benefits was maintained at age 60 
throughout the 1990s.   
                                                 
6 Benefits taken at age 60 are 70% of the age 65 benefit. If the initial acceptance of benefits is delayed until age 70, 
the benefit is 142% of the age 65 benefit (Sakamoto, 2001b).   5
If those benefit promises had been maintained in the face of Japan’s rapid pace of aging, 
additional tax revenue would have been required to cover promises made under NP and EPI rules 
(Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare, 1999). For instance, government review groups projected that 
EPI tax rates would have to increase from 17.35% to 34.5% of covered earnings by 2025, and 
contributions to the NP were projected to have to rise by about 100%.  As a result, a comprehensive 
review of benefit formulas, eligibility conditions, retirement ages, and financing options was conducted, 
resulting in the reform law of 2000.  
One key aspect of the 2000 public pension reforms was that they cut future social security 
benefits in various ways.  First, the EPI benefit formula was further curtailed by about 5%, from 0.75 to 
0.7125% per year of service.  Second, the indexation of EPI and NP retirement benefits for beneficiaries 
ages 65 and older was switched from wage indexation to price indexation.  Third, for future workers, the 
normal retirement age for the EPI pension was raised from 60 to 65 for both men and women.  These 
changes will be gradually phased in over time for new retirees.
7    It has been estimated that the 2000 
reforms reduced benefits in aggregate by approximately 20% (Takayama, 2001).   
Another aspect of the 2000 reforms was that they also altered future revenue streams. In 
particular, general revenues flowing into the NP were boosted, with the subsidy rising from one-third to 
one-half of the annual cost of the NP. Unlike the United States, where an earmarked payroll tax entirely 
finances the government old-age benefits at present, general revenue in Japan will be used to support even 
more of the total retirement system cost than before.  There has been considerable debate over the most 
appropriate way to support these subsidies, with some analysts favoring consumption taxes, while others 
oppose them (Takayama, 2001; Hatta, 2001).  The 2000 public pension reforms also hiked the maximum 
age for inclusion in the EPI program from 65 to 70 and extended covered earnings to include bonuses.  
Thus, future retirees will have substantially lower benefits that had previously been expected, even as 
they must pay higher taxes during their working years.  
                                                 
7 The higher normal retirement age will be phased in over the next two decades.  Persons born after April 2, 1961, 
will be eligible for full benefits for both the flat benefit and earnings related benefit at age 65.   6
As a result of these changes, the projected tax rate increase slated for the EPI was moderated; 
instead of doubling from 17.35% to 34.5%, it is now expected to grow to 27.8% of covered earnings 
based on recent projections.
8  Of course, this is still a substantial increase in payroll taxes required to 
support the social security system, and with the government subsidy, the total cost of the retirement 
system is larger still. Clearly Japan will continue to wrestle with the difficult issue of whether the public 
will agree to pay these higher taxes in the future, or whether it instead will reduce the public pension 
promise further (Clark and Ogawa, 1996).    
B. Japanese Company Pension Plans 
  In the presence of these changes in the EPI and NP, employers and employees must consider how 
they want employer pensions to evolve.  Should mandatory retirement ages be increased to match the new 
normal retirement ages in the EPI and NP?  Should normal retirement ages for employer pensions also be 
increased?  If social security benefits are being reduced, can employer pension benefits be expanded to 
keep retirement income at previous levels, or will current economic conditions mean that changes in 
employer pension plans will exacerbate the adverse effects of cuts in social security on retirement 
income?  Given legislated changes in social security, the future of retirement income will be determined 
in large measure by how employer pensions are changed. 
There are three main types of company retirement plans in Japan: unfunded severance benefit 
plans, the Employee Pension Funds (EPF), and the Tax Qualified Pension Plans (TQPP). More than 90% 
of all Japanese employees have severance pay plans that relate termination benefits to years of service and 
earnings.  These are financed from corporate operating revenue (they are book-reserved, for funding 
purposes). Severance benefits are typically paid as lump sums when workers leave their career employers.  
The average male retiree from a major corporation receives a severance payment of about ¥25 million 
(US$208,000) at retirement, equivalent to about 38 months of earnings (Seike, 1997).   
                                                 
8 If the government were to try to adjust benefits to the level of revenue supplied by the current 17.35% payroll tax, 
we estimate that benefits would have to decline by more than one-third.  This estimate is based on the simple 
calculation that if a specified benefit level requires 27.8% of covered earnings (0.278 times the wage base provides   7
The average size of severance payments from a large corporation has increased over time (from 
¥13 million in 1974, or US$108,000 in today’s terms), but it has declined relative to annual earnings.  
Average monthly earnings rose 3.5 times between 1974 and 1996 (from ¥88,000 to ¥305,000; US$733 to 
US$2,542), while retirement payments less than doubled (Seike, 1997).  One reason for this decline is the 
change in formulas used to determine severance pay and a reduction in the proportion of total 
compensation included in the determination of the benefit.  Another reason is that the prevalence of 
severance plans is declining, as more firms shift from lump-sum payments to pension plans paying 
annuities.  In 1974, 43% of large companies had only lump-sum retirement plans and no additional 
pension plan.  By 1996, only 5% of all firms relied solely on the severance pay plans for retirement 
benefits (Seike, 1997).  
Turning now to more conventional company pension plans, about half of all Japanese full-time 
employees participate in an EPF or a TQPP. There were 1,849 EPFs in 1999 covering over 12 million 
employees (Miyatake, 2000), a figure that represents 37% of all EPI participants (Employees’ Pension 
Fund Association, 1996).    By contrast, there were more than 91,000 TQPP plans covering over 10 
million workers.  In the past, Japanese companies were allowed to offer only DB plans of these two types, 
but 2001 legislation has expanded options for plan choice.   
EPF plans were introduced in 1966 to enable firms to provide earnings-related benefits to retired 
workers over and above the government earnings-related pension.  They were established mainly by 
larger employers with 500 or more employees.
9  These plans were permitted to partially “contract out” 
from paying contributions to the government pension system, in exchange for which they committed to 
provide benefits worth 130% of the EPI benefit.
  Historically, the EPFs have paid 3.2 to 3.8% of payroll 
to finance the contracted out component of the EPI (Employees’ Pension Fund Association, 1996).  EPF 
                                                                                                                                                             
sufficient revenues for an average benefit), then a tax rate of 17.35% of covered earnings would provide sufficient 
income for benefits that were 62% of the initial benefit level (17.35/27.8 = 0.62). 
9 An individual company with at least 500 employees can establish an EPF.  Allied companies can organize an EPF 
provided that they have 800 employees.  Multi-company EPFs can be established provided that the plan sponsor has 
3,000 participants.  (Employees’ Pension Fund Association, 1996).   8
benefits based on the contracted-out or “substitutional” EPI component may be paid in the form of a life 
annuity, while supplemental benefits may be lump sum.  Approximately 40% of beneficiaries opted to 
take a lump-sum distribution for the supplementary benefits in 1997 (Chunhong, 2000). EPFs have been 
regulated by the Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare, and have had to meet more reporting and 
funding standards than other types of Japanese pension plans.   
TQPPs were first established in 1962, and they have been adopted by many small and medium-
size firms as well as some larger firms. Companies must have at least 15 employees to establish a TQPP.  
Most TQPPs are financed entirely from employer contributions, though in theory, employees are 
permitted to contribute to these plans. Despite their name (“tax qualified pension plans”), they are legally 
subject to an annual asset tax levied on the value of the pension portfolio, worth about 1.173% of assets. 
Most retirees under these plans can elect 10-year certain payouts, but most select a lump-sum option.  The 
TQPPs have been supervised by the Ministry of Finance, historically, which has led to an entirely 
different set of regulations than those that govern the EPFs.     
The growth of EPF pension plans in Japan has produced a DB plan asset pool (EPF plus TQPP) 
estimated at about US$0.6 trillion, much smaller than the US private sector asset base (Sakamoto, 2001; 
Johnson, 2001). It must also be emphasized that any pension asset estimates are not directly comparable 
with those from other countries, since Japanese pension plans have traditionally marked assets at book 
value instead of market value; EPF assets have been marked to market only since 1997.  Furthermore, 
Japanese asset values are currently quite depressed, and pension investment performance has been quite 
poor of late. The government suggested that pension investment returns be targeted at 5.5% annually and 
the Corporate Income Tax Law requires that the assumed ROR be at least 5%; nevertheless, actual 
investment returns have been far lower. This is in part because of pension fund managerial conservatism, 
which is a legacy of the old regulatory 5:3:3:2 rule requiring that plans hold at least 50% in secure assets 
such as long-term government bonds. These rules also limited other investments: caps were 30% on 
domestic stocks, 30% in foreign-currency assets, and 20% in real estate (Gordon, 1999).  Recent evidence 
suggests that the EPF plans continue to allocate their portfolios in roughly this manner (Sekine, 2001).    9
Limited evidence indicates that Japanese pensions are currently quite underfunded, at least 
according to Western standards.
10  Chunhong (2000) and Goldman Sachs (1999) estimate that the total 
amount of underfunding in private corporate sector pension plans is between ¥40 and 60 trillion (US$404 
to 485 billion). A 1996 study of 24 Japanese firms listed on the NYSE shows that pension assets were 
worth only 40% of liabilities (Gordon, 1999).  According to data from the EPFA (Sakamoto 2001), half 
of all EPF plans in 1999 had less than 90% of the assets needed to cover liabilities, but these calculations 
do not adopt ERISA-type standards (Cerulli 2001).
11  Severance pay plans tend to be not funded, and this 
liability represents yet another US$324-404B (Goldman Sachs, 1999).  Such extensive underfunding 
poses risks for existing DB plans, and it also makes the transition to new DB or DC plans more difficult.  
 
II.  The Introduction of DC and New DB Plans in Japan  
  Financial  deregulation in Japan has been in full swing since the mid-1990s. The major impetus 
driving this effort was the desire to move toward a system where banks, insurers, securities firms, 
investment advisors, and foreign money managers would compete on a more level playing field (Cargill 
et al., 1997).  For the first time, foreign money managers were permitted entry, companies began (slowly) 
to adopt international accounting standards, and insurance regulation was relaxed (Patrikis, 1998). 
  Accompanying this effort to modernize Japan’s financial environment came a change in the rules 
governing employer-sponsored pensions. The changes were intended to make more flexible the heavily 
regulated system that previously “stifled creativity and short-changed the country's savers” (MacIntyre, 
1998). Nevertheless this has been a gradual process. For instance, in 1999, the government eliminated the 
requirement that Employee Pension Funds liquidate their entire holdings when changing investment 
managers, and it further eliminated the practice of requiring fixed brokerage commissions on stock trades. 
                                                 
10 Underfunding in the pension context refers to a gap between the pension plan assets and accrued liabilities. In the 
defined benefit context, under US private sector pension law, a plan would be underfunded if its assets valued at 
current market prices were less than the accumulated benefit obligation (ABO); see McGill et al. (1996). 
11 More specifically, 0.8% of EPF plans had assets that were less than 60% of liabilities, 8.8% of plans were 
between 60 and 70%, 21.6% of plans were between 70 and 80%, 19.8% were between 80 and 90%, and 18.0% of all 
EPFs had funding between 90 and 100% of assets (Sakamoto, 2001a).     10
Subsequently, investment advisory firms were permitted to manage pension assets, whereas only trust 
banks and insurers had been allowed to do so previously. Life insurers gained entry to the mutual fund 
business, and the state-owned postal savings and life insurance bureaus (Yucho and Kampo) received 
permission to hire specialist investment managers to handle over ¥300 trillion in postal saving system 
assets (US$2.5 trillion; Asia Agenda International 2001).  As Lincoln and Litan (1998) have noted, it was 
hoped that “by allowing Japanese pension funds greater investment freedom—specifically, broader 
authority to purchase equities, domestic and foreign—the Big Bang [would] help ease the pressure on 
Japanese corporations to fund their pension plans with current earnings.” 
A. The Pension Reform Bill of 2001 
  The Japanese government took a further step toward modernizing its pension sector in June of 
2001 with legislation that alters plan design choices and aspects of existing plans (see Table 1).  In many 
ways, this bill continues and extends the process of financial sector reforms implemented during the late 
1990s as they apply to pensions.
12   
Table 1 here 
  The pension reform bill contained features pertaining to both defined contribution (DC) and 
defined benefit (DB) plans. Focusing first on the DC set, the key elements were (William M. Mercer, 
2001): 
n Companies are permitted to offer DC pensions as of October of 2001.  
n A corporate DC plan may be financed by tax-deductible employer contributions. (Employee 
contributions into such plans are not permitted.) If the plan sponsor has no other pension plan, 
annual tax-qualified DC contributions are capped at  ¥432,000 (US$3,472); however if another 
tax-qualified plan is available, the taxable annual maximum DC contribution is reduced to 
¥216,000 (US$1,736). 
n A worker whose company offers no other pension may alternatively be offered a DC plan into 
which he can contribute out of pre-tax earnings up to an annual limit of  ¥180,000 (US$1,447). 
No employer contributions are permitted in this case.  The self-employed may set up DC plans 
into which they can contribute  ¥816,000 (US$7,700).   
n Employer DC plan contributions vest in three years and are portable if the worker changes 
companies. 
                                                 
12 Cerulli (1999, 2000) has a useful discussion of the various players in the Japanese financial market and why they 
supported earlier versions of DC pension legislation in Japan.   11
n Participants must be provided at least 3 investment choices for their DC monies, one of which 
must be principal -guaranteed. Participants will be able to change investment allocations every 
three months. 
n DC pension payouts may be taken as a lump sum or annuity as early as age 60 and payouts must 
commence by age 70.  A 60-year old must have at least 10 years of participation; the service 
requirement falls to age 65 after which only one month of service is required. 
n Companies must obtain employee permission before instituting a DC plan, and must obtain 
authorization from at least half of all employees before terminating an old DB plan and moving to 
a DC plan. 
 
The pension reform bill of June 2001 also contained elements relevant to corporate sponsors of 
defined benefit plans (DB): 
n Companies offering TQPP plans will be required to terminate them within a decade (Sakamoto, 
2001a).   
n Employers offering EPF plans will be permitted to divest themselves of the contracted-out 
“substitutional” element of their EPF plan (Sakamoto, 2001a).  This will permit plan sponsors to 
gain relief from paying that portion of the government earnings-related pension by transferring a 
lump sum of assets to the government.  However participants in the newly constituted DB plans 
will no longer be granted an exemption from the asset tax that had been imposed only on TQPP 
plans. The specific rules governing this restructuring of old EPF plans remain to be clarified.  The 
Pension Fund Investment Fund will manage these assets and be responsible for paying the 
previously contracted out benefits (Cerulli 2001).  
 
  In addition to permitting new DC and DB plans, the 2001 law alters important aspects of the 
pension regulatory environment.
13 The most evident change is that the new Ministry of Health, Labor, and 
Welfare (MHLW) will now supervise and regulate all DB plans as well as all new DC plans.  In the past, 
the Ministry of Finance (MOF) had supervised TQPP plans; however now these plans must be terminated 
within ten years, and all new plans will be under the regulatory control of the MHLW.  How these 
regulatory and supervisory tasks are to be managed at MHLW has not yet been clarified.   
It appears that the severance pay plans mentioned above will be unaffected by this most recent 
pension law change; if so, they will remain book reserve and unfunded.  However, the restructuring of 
pension plans in response to the 2001 legislation along with the continued evolution of other types of 
compensation may encourage firms to alter or eliminate their severance pay plans. 
                                                 
13 The Financial Services Agency will supervise the function of financial institutions that are managing the assets of 
pension funds.   12
B. Defined Contribution Pensions in Japan: Unsettled Issues  
   The new legislation on DC plans in Japan differs from that governing US 401(k) plans, which are 
DC pensions named after the section of the US tax code that established them.
14 In evaluating the 2001 
law changes, we have organized our comments about the emerging Japanese DC model according to the 
four main functions of a pension plan: collecting contributions, recordkeeping and reporting, managing 
investments, and paying benefits.  
Issues pertaining to contributions and membership: 
1. Which kinds of workers will be allowed to participate in the new DC plans? 
  In practice, there may be administrative cost reasons to limit entry to workers under (or over) a 
cutoff age; or to restrict membership to new employees; or to limit participation to full-time workers.  In 
the past, most part-time Japanese employees have not participated in company plans, leaving those 
workers with low coverage rates.
15  Rules for DC plan participation in Japan are still being developed: 
whether these workers will now be included in company pensions, as the labor force becomes more 
flexible, will be interesting to watch. It is notable that Pasona, the first firm to adopt a DC pension plan in 
Japan, is a temporary employment agency that offers its part-time employees access to a portable pension 
program along with full-time workers.  The 2001 regulations specify that the maximum age for employee 
participation in DC plans must be age 60. 
2. Can the tax-qualified cap on employer contributions be increased, and will employees be allowed to 
contribute additional funds? 
When pension reform legislation was being developed, many analysts and industry leaders 
expected that the level of tax-qualified contributions permitted in Japanese DC plans would be similar to 
those in the US 401(k) environment.  However, the low employer contribution ceilings in the 2001 bill 
reflected the government’s reluctance to allow more compensation to be protected from tax at a time 
                                                 
14 For more on 401(k) plans in the US context see McGill et al. (1996). 
15 This is similar to the US where part-time employees have much lower pension coverage rates than full-time 
employees.   13
when the economy was depressed and tax revenues were relatively low, producing fiscal deficits.  The 
tax-qualified employer DC contributions under the new Japanese law are capped at an annual US$3,472, 
about 6% of annual salary (Cerulli, 1999).
16  Additionally, no matching employee contributions are 
permitted to these plans in Japan.  By contrast, in the US, employee contributions to a 401(k) plan may 
total $10,500 per year, a legal limit slated to rise to $15,000 in 2006.  In addition, US employers can 
match employee contributions: the combined employer and employee DC contribution cap is now 
$35,000, and it will rise to $40,000 by 2006 (Portman and Cardin, 2001).  New regulations allowing 
employee contributions in Japan would likely enhance the appeal of the DC model.  
  To help assess what a maximum contribution of about US$3,500 might generate over work lives 
of various lengths for Japanese workers, we have prepared Table 2. This indicates the approximate 
accumulation value and an implied annuity payout of a DC plan over 10, 20, and 30 years of 
contributions.  For example, after 30 years of investing the maximum contribution in a relatively safe 
asset such as might be permitted in the new Japanese DC environment, the worker could amass almost 
US$122,000 (assuming a relatively conservative 1% real return).  The annuity value of such an 
accumulation might be worth at most about US$8,300 per year for men, or about 14% of current average 
earnings.
17 The benefits are much smaller for shorter contribution periods: for instance after 10 years of 
saving, the annual payout would come to at most $2,500 or about 4% of current average earnings. 
Table 2 here 
One factor that might make DC plan establishment more appealing in Japan is the possibility that 
companies could fund a new DC plan by contributing a tax-free lump sum recognizing workers’ past 
service. It has been suggested that this would be equivalent to the annual maximum DC contribution level 
multiplied by each worker’s years of service, plus a credit of the guaranteed rate of return promised by the 
                                                 
16 A firm that offers another tax-qualified plan is limited to an employer maximum DC contribution of only 
US$1,736 per year. A self-employed worker may contribute US$7,700 to a tax -qualified plan, and an employee 
lacking any company plan may contribute up to US$1,447 on a tax-qualified basis. 
17 This computation uses the Japanese EPF annuitant table and assumes no loads and no administrative costs; see 
McCarthy and Mitchell (2000).    14
DB plan – traditionally 5.5% (Cerulli 2001).  While this might jump-start the formation DC plans, coming 
up with the lump sum might be difficult for firms that severely underfunded DB plans.  A related issue is 
that the government has signaled a willingness to permit firms to terminate an old DB plan and move 
surplus assets into the new DC plan.  We discuss this possibility below in more detail. 
Issues pertaining to record keeping: 
  One lesson from the US market is that recordkeeping requires a substantial investment in 
information technology and a clean system of tracking individual participants (Mitchell 1998). While 
Japan has no system of unique taxpayer identification numbers, it has recently adopted a system of social 
security numbers to assist in the management of retirement accounts.  In the past, the lack of unique 
identification numbers has made it difficult to both collect taxes and track employee accounts (Anderson, 
1999).  The fact that the new DC plans will be very small at the outset also exacerbates the start-up 
administrative and recordkeeping cost problems. If frequent fund transfers are permitted, this will also 
make it more costly to provide plan reporting and recordkeeping. 
  As a result, some have expressed concern that the likely small initial size of Japanese DC 
accounts will render the business unprofitable. For instance, Ruffel (2001) argues that “US experience 
shows that recordkeeping has proven in the main a distinctly unprofitable enterprise.” Unless economies 
of scale and scope are perceived, this line of business in Japan will likely not prove very profitable in the 
short term. Thus Cerulli (1999) estimates that until DC accounts amount to at least US$80 billion, 
recordkeepers will not break even. On the other hand, Sumitomo predicts that it will take only three years 
to cover start-up costs, and Fidelity has suggested that its expertise in the 401(k) market should help that 
firm arrive at break-even sooner (Anderson, 1999).   
Issues pertaining to investment management of DC plans: 
1. Who will manage the money? 
  There is substantial controversy about who will manage the money in the new Japanese DC 
framework. Some analysts estimate that 75% of new funds flowing into these plans will be principal-
guaranteed products (Anderson, 1999); others note that “(i)n the short term, there will be a preference for   15
capital guaranteed-type products and that will favour in the short-term domestic players and not foreign 
players” (Johnson, 2001).   
  Additionally, Western experts suggest that DC plans require “a population willing to take 
advantage of newly available financial instruments. But the Japanese public remains distinctively risk 
averse in its investment decisions, keeping a high share of its savings in the form of bank accounts and 
insurance policies. It is not at all clear that many people will broaden their savings portfolios to include 
asset-backed securities, foreign mutual funds, derivatives, foreign bank accounts, and other investment 
opportunities. In the absence of an eager household sector, financial deregulation could leave the Japanese 
financial system under the continued domination of banks, which may end up as the primary holders of 
the new financial instruments” (Lincoln and Litan, 1998).  
  Based on the US experience, it would not be surprising if, during the early phases, DC plan 
participants tended to select fairly conservative investment holdings; on the other hand, they will be more 
likely to move to a better diversified portfolio, after learning more about the options. This process will be 
influence by the investment choices selected by plan sponsors, who select the types of options made 
available in their fiduciary role.   
2. How will investors be educated about risk and return? 
An interesting set of issues not yet settled in the changing Japanese pension environment is how 
plan sponsors and managers will handle a whole new set of responsibilities that heretofore they have not 
had to worry about.  For example, plan sponsors must now ensure that contributions are actually invested, 
they must choose participant investment options; and they must as well as select and evaluate money 
managers.  In the future, they will have to educate participants about risk and return.
18 Eventually, they 
must see that benefits are paid. Some argue that DC plans are, in fact,  “un-Japanese” and that it will be 
difficult to educate workers on how to manage their portfolios since they are not accustomed to taking 
                                                 
18 Pension plans with individual accounts that require employees to make contribution and investment decisions 
necessitate that workers have a certain degree of financial literacy.  Important issues for discussion include the 
extent of worker knowledge of financial markets, their understanding of the investment process, and the role of   16
this responsibility. However, as one expert notes, “Japan has a math-literate population that will quickly 
grasp investment concepts…the empowerment of the individual could be surprisingly strong where they 
can participate in the market, and believe it to be a fair and well-regulated arena” (Global Custodian, 
1998). 
A related but not well-appreciated point is that the Japanese government is slowly altering its 
position on guaranteeing bank savings deposits. In particular, instead of providing a 100% guarantee as in 
the past, the government has indicated that only the first US$85,000 of assets will be protected at some 
point in the future (this would amount to only 30% of Japanese bank deposits; Anderson, 1999).  
Eliminating the full guarantee for all benefits will not take place until mid-2003, but this change might 
powerfully alter DC plan participants’ views of the principal-guaranteed investment option mandated for 
the DC plan. 
3.  Will the new DC plans be subject to tax on inside buildup?   
  Japan has a tradition of exempting contributions into pension plans but taxing the asset value of 
the TQPP pension fund. The tax of 1.173% on the value of TQPP assets has been suspended until 2003, 
in view of the very low returns being earned by pension fund assets over the last decade.  It is not known 
at present whether the suspension will be continued or the tax reimposed.  Inevitably, imposition of such a 
high tax on Japanese pension funds that are invested in assets with extraordinarily low returns will 
discourage new pension formation. 
Issues pertaining to payouts: 
1.  How will portability and vesting be handled? 
  At this juncture, little is known about how the new Japanese DC pension system will function in 
terms of vesting and portability. In the DC context, vesting refers to workers’ claims on plan 
accumulations if they leave their employers prior to retirement. US employer contributions must be 
vested after 5 years, and the majority of 401(k) plans allow vesting earlier than that (one-third allow 
                                                                                                                                                             
companies in the provision of such education.  These issues are also receiving considerable attention in the United 
States (Clark and d’Ambrosio, 2001).   17
immediate vesting; Mitchell, forthcoming).  Job-changing workers in the US are permitted to preserve 
their tax-qualified vested accumulations by moving the funds into either a new employer plan or into a 
“rollover” account handled by a licensed investment manager (McGill et al., 1996).  The new regulations 
in Japan allow workers who change jobs to move all vested accumulations from one DC plan into another 
offered by the new employer.  If the new employer does not offer a DC plan, the worker can leave the 
funds with the old employer’s plan, or he may move them to the National Pension Fund Association.  The 
new Japanese pension laws require that all employer contributions be vested after three years.  While 
portability is specifically recognized in the regulations, the mechanism for exchanging pension assets 
across firms is as yet unclear. 
2.  What about other types of payouts? 
  In addition to rollover payouts, a set of rules must be written to govern pension payouts at 
retirement. It appears that the minimum age at which workers will be permitted to access the funds 
(known as the “preservation age” in some circles) will be 60 for the new Japanese DC plans. This is 
interesting since the national pension system’s (NP) normal retirement age is slated to rise to 65.  The 
difference in the retirement ages under the two systems may create potentially unexpected incentives. As 
an illustration, retirees in Australia may access their entire DC accounts at 60 and spend down the entire 
amounts, prior to eligibility for a means-tested national benefit at 65 (Bateman et al., 2002).  However, in 
Japan, some employers and older workers may anticipate that the company DC plan will support 
retirement consumption between age 60 and the age at which they are eligible to receive social security 
benefits. 
  This also illustrates the important interaction between the preservation age and how the funds can 
be accessed. In the US, many 401(k) plans provide lump sum payouts and only about one-quarter offer an 
annuity option (Mitchell, forthcoming).  Allowing job changers to access their entire DC accumulations 
may undermine the plan’s purpose as a retirement saving vehicle.  An immediate spend-down is 
discouraged in the US; although 401(k) plan participants may receive their entire account in a lump sum 
if they wish, someone over age 70 must pay income tax on the entire lump sum, and a retiree younger   18
than 59½  pays income tax as well as a 20% penalty on the sum. Another concern is that people may not 
buy inflation-indexed annuities with their DC accumulations, leaving them vulnerable to inflation and 
longevity risk (J. Brown et al., 2001). 
C. Defined Benefit Pensions in Japan: Unsettled Issues 
  Just as several questions remain that, until they are clarified, will retard the development of DC 
plans in Japan, similar questions arise concerning the continued use of DB plans.  These issues are 
organized according to the four main functions of a pension plan: collecting contributions, recordkeeping 
and reporting, managing investments, and paying benefits.  
Issues pertaining to membership and contributions: 
1. What types of plans will be permitted?  
Under the new pension law and regulations, there will clearly be a continued commitment to 
traditional DB plans in Japan, although many of these will now lack the contracting-out substitutional 
element previously found in the EPFs.  There is also widespread belief that cash-balance or hybrid 
schemes will be allowed, although the method for establishment of such plans remains to be developed.  
Given the very low “safe” asset returns in Japan currently, it appears that hybrid plans could offer 
guaranteed rates of return only just over 1% (Cerulli, 2001). The lower the guaranteed rate of return, the 
less appealing are cash balance plans. Unless foreign investment is pushed strongly as part of the funds 
portfolio, the low returns on domestic Japanese assets will make it more difficult to offer higher returns. 
Legally, hybrid plans will be DB plans, just as they are in the US (Feinberg 2001a).    
2. Who will establish these new DB plans? 
  A company that previously sponsored a DB plan might consider moving to new DB plan 
depending on the type of plan it offered and its funding status: 
n If a firm previously offered a TQPP plan, it must now terminate the plan within 10 years. As 
noted above, plan sponsors are typically smaller (15 employees and up), and they have tended to 
pay mainly lump sum benefits due to tax preferences. It appears that underfunding is a substantial 
problem in this sector, which may be a constraint if firms with TQPPs seek to set up new DB or 
DC plans.   
n If a firm previously provided an EPF with the substitutional element, it may be entitled to buy out 
of the substitutional or contracted-out portion of the EPF plan by presenting the government with   19
a satisfactory asset transfer to cover the buy-back. After this transfer is made, an EPF plan might 
or might not have sufficient assets to continue as a reformulated DB plan (without the contracted-
out portion), or to move toward a DC. Alternatively, the former-EPF plan may be allowed to 
amortize unfunded liabilities over a 20-year period after covering its obligation for the 
substitutional amount.  Final regulations on these issues are still pending (Sakamoto, 2001b). 
 
One key factor affecting the decision to offer a new DB plan is how the company’s employees 
would react to the change. According to Japanese labor law, at least 50% of all employees must agree to 
convert a company pension from a DB to a DC. As an alternative, however, some firms have been 
allowed to terminate their old DB plan without obtaining the 50% permission and have issued a lump-
sum cash payout to discharge their old plan obligations.  EPF plans can only be terminated with the 
approval of 75% of their trustees (Sakamoto, 2001b). At some future date, such companies may start up a 
new plan (DB or DC). In other words, a firm’s plan choice under the new rules will be influenced by the 
extent of underfunding in its old DB plan as well as workers’ agreement. If the plan has assets insufficient 
to cover the substitutional component of the EPF, it would be less likely to adopt a new plan. 
A related issue is how the old EPF plan obligations are to be calculated when determining the 
assets sufficient to permit divestiture of the contracted-out portion. Regulations are still to appear 
regarding the buyout price for the EPF substitutional benefit. One approach might require valuing 
workers’ and retirees’ Accumulated Benefit Obligations (ABO) and setting aside assets sufficient to cover 
that portion of plan benefits. In this event, the choice of a discount rate becomes of paramount 
importance.  Using a high rate shrinks future liabilities and makes it easier to set aside assets adequate to 
achieve the buy-back.  Another possibility suggested by Japanese pension experts is that a firm might 
have to ante up a lump-sum equivalent to foregone contributions relative to the substitutional element in 
the EPF plan, plus very likely a low rate of return.  
3. Will employee contributions be permitted?  
The old EPF plans did permit employers and employees to share the financing of the 
substitutional component of the plan benefits. Similarly the TQPPs were permitted to have employee 
contributions, although in most cases, employers contributed the entire amounts (Conrad, 2001). It is not   20
yet clear whether the new DB plans will be permitted to take employee contributions on a voluntary or 
mandatory basis.   
4. Will the new DB plans be subject to tax on inside buildup?  
  As noted above, the 1.173% of assets tax on TQPP pensions is in suspension currently, but the plan is 
to reinstate the tax in 2003.  Old DB plans may have little in the way of assets to tax.  The asset tax may 
become important when the new DB plans amass some assets. 
Issues pertaining to record keeping: 
1.  Will recordkeeping and reporting change for those employers remining with conventional DB plans 
alone?  
    According to available information, publicly-traded firms providing DB plans in Japan must 
move to implement international accounting standards. This will require recognizing pension liabilities 
using more realistic discount rates, and presumably will also lead to market valuation in measuring 
pension assets (Choy, 1999).    
2.  How will recordkeeping change if cash balance plans are permitted?  
If cash balance or hybrid plans are accounted for as DB plans, as they are in the US, this will 
require the recordkeeping and reporting mentioned above, as well as the need to track and report on 
contributions made on individual workers’ behalf, plus investment returns and individual accumulations.   
Issues pertaining to investment management of DB plans: 
1. How might DB investment change? 
  As part of the Big Bang financial liberalization process, DB plan managers will no longer be 
required to assume that assets will return 5.5% per annum when projecting future pension costs. To the 
extent that plan sponsors do assume more realistic (and likely far lower) returns consistent with long-term 
Japanese patterns, this will reduce the chance that the newly-formed DB plans will become seriously 
underfunded. In addition, adopting modern investment strategies could also boost investment 
performance and enhance DB plan appeal, an avenue that institutional investors have already begun to 
explore.  The Employees’ Pension Fund Association in Tokyo, which oversees EPF pension management,   21
recently introduced concepts of risk management to its member managers.  Noboru Terada, a member of 
the Investment Expert Committee of the Government Pension Investment Fund, has expressed strong 
interest in indexing so as to hold down fees (Feinberg, 2001b). Terada has also pushed for a clearer 
statement of pension fiduciary responsibility, along the lines of the US ERISA law (Global Custodian, 
1998).    
2. Will investment patterns become more diversified? 
  To the extent that domestic asset returns remain depressed, it will remain difficult for DB plan 
sponsors to meet investment targets, and to avoid underfunding. For this reason DB plans are increasingly 
investing outside Japan. For instance, in 1998, Sony indicated that it would move a substantial component 
of its pension assets outside Japan in the hopes of reaping better rewards (Global Custodian, 1998). 
Further, Honda Motor Co. has invested almost half its US$4.6B pension fund outside Japan (MacDonald, 
1998). 
Issues pertaining to payouts: 
How will annuities be handled? 
  When the EPFs were integrated with the government earnings-related pension, the plan sponsor 
was responsible for base nominal benefits but not for the inflation-indexation component of the EPI 
benefit. Whether the de-integration of DB plan benefits will alter this policy has not yet been clarified. 
 
III. Pension Plan Developments in the United States   
  For the past 25 years, employer pension plans in the United States have been moving away from 
traditional defined benefit plans, toward defined contribution and various types of hybrid plans, especially 
cash balance plans.  These developments have been in response to changes in government regulations that 
increased the cost of defined benefit plans, new tax policies that permitted pre-tax employee contributions 
to 401(k) plans, changes in the composition of the labor force, and fluctuations in the rate of economic 
growth.  This section provides a brief history of the continuing evolution of occupational pensions in the 
United States.  These developments and their causes can be compared to the current situation in Japan   22
with the hope that analysis of US trends can provide some insights into the possible development of 
Japanese pension plans in the coming decade.    
A. Developments in US Defined Benefit Pensions  
Historically, pensions in the United States were primarily final pay, defined benefit plans that 
provided early retirement subsidies to many employees.  These plans were especially prominent among 
large, unionized employers, and in the public sector.  Since the mid-1970s, there has been a dramatic and 
continuing movement away from the use of DB plans and toward greater adoption of DC plans.  More 
than 80% of pension participants were covered by a defined benefit plan in 1979, but by the mid-1990s, 
coverage by defined benefit plans had declined to only 50% of pension participants (PBGC, 1999).  The 
rapid growth of DC plans is attributed to changes in government regulation that increased the cost of 
defined benefit plans relative to defined contribution plans, especially for small plans (Clark and 
McDermed, 1990). As a result, virtually no small employers now offer DB pensions.  In addition, 
regulations permitting the development of 401(k) plans stimulated a rapid growth in these plans that allow 
pre-tax employer and employee contributions (Papke, 1999).  Defined contribution plans tend to be more 
portable, and today’s employees seem to place a greater emphasis on these individual account plans that 
can be taken with them when they change jobs. 
In the last 15 years, some larger firms transformed their traditional DB plans into so-called 
“hybrid” or cash balance pensions. Legally these are classified as defined benefit pensions, but they have 
many characteristics of defined contribution plans.  BankAmerica created the first hybrid pension in 1985.  
During the 1990s, the number of plan conversions increased, and by 2000, some 400 US companies had 
adopted a cash balance plan. Today, about 20% of the Fortune 500 firms offer cash balance plans (Cerulli, 
2001).  
Companies that establish cash balance pensions offer workers a mix of features taken from both 
DB and DC designs. Table 3 illustrates key features of DB and DC plans and compares them to cash 
balance provisions.  Many contribution and participation features of a cash balance plan are similar to 
those of traditional DB plans, rather than to most DC plans, which allow employees to make decisions   23
about participation and contribution rates.  On the other hand, cash balance plans largely eliminate 
penalties for workers who terminate employment prior to retirement, which makes them similar to DC 
plans.  The accumulation of accounts and provision of lump-sum benefits at termination facilitate 
communication and portability like 401(k) plans. 
Table 3 here   
Cash balance plans alleviate some but not all of the financial market risks faced by workers in 
self-directed DC plans. This is because a worker’s account balance is credited with an annual rate of 
return equal to some specific rate such as the T-bill rate, selected usually by the employer. This reduces 
his exposure to investment risk in a DC plan.  The plan sponsor does retain investment risk in cash 
balance plans, but the investment return promised workers is typically set so earnings on plan assets are 
anticipated to cover the guarantee. The worker still retains some residual investment risk in a cash balance 
plan, since benchmark rates used for crediting of returns to accounts will change over time.  Nevertheless, 
the expectation would be that these will be less volatile than stock market returns.  The participant also 
faces the risk that the plan sponsor might change the benchmark crediting rate over time. 
Cash balance plans also have other differences from traditional DB pensions. One key feature is 
that they are more age-neutral than traditional DB plans in their retirement incentives. This arises because 
they tend not to have early retirement subsidies, as depicted in Figure 2. This illustrates the typical 
backloaded accrual pattern common to conventional DB pensions, and the much smoother accrual pattern 
pertinent to the typical cash balance plan.  Another difference is that US cash balance plans must offer an 
annuity as a benefit option since they are legally DB plans; most also offer lump-sum benefits.  Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that the overwhelming majority of workers takes lump-sum benefits when offered the 
choice under these plans. 
Figure 2 here 
B. Changing Views on Retirement Plan Design  
A decade of US economic expansion, accompanied by a slower rate of growth in the labor force, 
has had a powerful impact on many companies’ human resource policies.  Previously, older workers were   24
encouraged to retire so they could be replaced by lower-cost younger workers.  More recently, employers 
have sought new methods to retain senior employees as hiring young workers became difficult.  The 
composition of the labor force has also changed, prompting employers to accommodate the preferences of 
a more diverse and more mobile workforce.   
These changes in the US labor market environment are manifested in changes in pension plan 
offerings and plan design.  One development is that some firms have altered their DB plans to stop 
encouraging workers to retire in their 50s and early 60s. Research shows that eliminating early retirement 
subsidies in a traditional DB plan greatly curtails retirement benefits for many employees, whereas 
converting to a cash balance plans can mitigate this benefit change (Clark and Schieber, 2001 
forthcoming).   
Another development is that companies are changing the entire structure and composition of 
employee compensation (K. Brown et al., 2000).  Thus, converting a DB into a cash balance plan is also 
sometimes accompanied by changes in retiree health insurance provisions, or changes in contribution 
rates to supplemental retirement accounts.  Companies have also reduced pension costs and then used 
cost-savings to offer more competitive non-pension compensation.  Many US employers have focused on 
retaining productive senior employees, so that changes in pay and benefits reflect this new perspective. 
A further explanation for the US trend to DC and cash balance plans is that workers often have 
difficulty understanding the value provided in DB plans. As a result, they may not value the expenses 
associated with traditional DB pensions (Clark and Munzenmaier, 2001).  Financial concerns have also 
influenced employer decisions to shift from traditional DB to cash balance plans.  This is because cash 
balance benefit accruals are smoother and more predictable throughout workers’ careers, as compared to 
accruals in traditional DB plans.  This sometimes stabilizes the stream of employer contributions needed 
to cover cash balance plans.   
In some instances, US employees have argued that their employer may have used a cash balance 
conversion to limit or reduce the employer’s expenditures on pension benefits. However, the evidence 
indicates that the results are more disparate. Some companies have lower costs after plan conversion,   25
while others increase retirement expenditures; furthermore, many companies have essentially the same 
retirement costs before and afterward (K. Brown, et al., 2000).  It has been claimed that some firms 
shifted to a cash balance plan when the traditional DB plans were overfunded.  This conjecture is widely 
believed; however, the data show that many traditional DB plans that were not converted to cash balance 
plans were just as well-funded as those that were converted (Clark, Haley, and Schieber, 2001). 
C. Worker Preferences for Retirement Plan Type 
Limited evidence indicates that workers prefer some of the characteristics in Table 3 that hybrid 
plans share with defined contribution plans.  Foremost among these is the element of individual accounts.  
It has been found that workers better understand having their own individual account balances, as 
compared to assessing the value of future benefits under a traditional DB plan (Clark and Munzenmaier, 
2001; Third Millennium, 1999).   
  Another important feature of retirement plans with individual accounts is that the vested account 
balance is immediately available to a worker if he leaves the firm at any age.  In other words, the current 
value of the pension is the same whether the worker remains with the firm or quits.  In contrast, 
traditional DB plans tend to be backloaded, as discussed above, paying greater benefits to someone who 
remains with the firm until at least the age of early retirement.  The portability feature of cash balance 
plans and DC plans is important to the increasingly diverse labor force in the US.  Young workers in 
today’s labor force are less likely to believe that they will work for the same firm for 30 or 40 years.  
Instead, expectations are that they will change jobs several times and as a result, they are more likely to 
demand retirement plans that have portable benefits. 
D.  Implications for Japanese Pension Plans  
  What implications might these US developments over the past three decades have for Japanese 
pension plans in the twenty-first century?  What are the parallels that could lead to predictions about how 
Japanese plans will evolve?  First, it seems clear that in the US, the emergence of defined contribution 
plans was driven, in part, by changes in regulations and tax policy.  In the 1970s, the US government 
adopted regulatory policies that sharply increased the cost of defined benefit plans relative to defined   26
contribution plans, especially among small firms.  In addition, changes in tax laws in the 1980s allowed 
the development of new types of defined contribution plans based on employee contributions, the 401(k) 
plans.  New changes in tax and regulatory policy may stimulate similar changes in Japan.  However, as 
we have noted, the caps on employer contributions to defined contribution plans in Japan are much more 
restrictive than in the United States, and current regulations do not allow both employer and employee 
contributions to the same plans. 
  Second, changes in the composition of the US labor force have increased the demand for more 
portable pensions.  Worker preferences for individual accounts, the option of lump-sum distributions 
based on accruals to date, less backloading of benefits, and easier to understand pension plans have also 
played a major role in the movement toward defined contribution and hybrid pension plans.  As the 
Japanese system of industrial relations continues to evolve, these issues may become increasingly 
important to Japanese workers.  In such a context, the growth of DC plans will proceed more rapidly. 
  Third, the recent period of rapid US economic growth, in conjunction with a slowly growing 
labor force, has induced employers to develop human resource policies that retain older workers.  
Traditional DB plans embody important early retirement incentives, put in place during an era when 
employers were attempting to encourage early retirement.  The Japanese labor force is also aging very 
rapidly, and the government is prodding companies to raise retirement ages.  While the economic 
stagnation in Japan implies that companies are relatively uninterested in retaining older employees, the 
long-term demographic shift may stimulate modifications in pension policies along the lines seen in the 
US. 
  The importance of these factors in Japan will help determine the growth of DC and cash balance 
plans during the next decade.  The US experience clearly illustrates that, under certain conditions, the 
transition from a system of mainly defined benefit pensions to one relying heavily on defined contribution 
plans can be quite rapid. 
   27
IV. Discussion and Conclusions   
  During the 2001 Japanese pension reform debate, plan sponsors, financial analysts, and many 
Japanese government officials indicated interest in reforming the nation’s pension system.  The 2001 
legislation will surely spur the formation of new plans and the termination of some old ones.  Despite the 
fact that a full set of regulations is not yet fully specified, some companies are already taking the 
initiative.  Two large financial firms, Nomura Securities Co. and Nikko Securities Co., recently 
announced they will be withdrawing from their multi-employer DB association known as the Japan 
Securities Dealers Employees Pension Fund, to set up DC plans (Singer, 2001).  This is consistent with 
Ruffell’s view (2001) that many companies wish to relieve themselves of the old DB plans: “(t)he 
unfunded pension liabilities of corporate Japan defy measurement and they are growing daily—an awful 
domestic equity market, compounded by the truly woeful historic performance of the trust banks which 
manage the overwhelming bulk of institutional funds in Japan, has ensured that Japanese corporations 
have done nothing but contribute year after year into their defined benefit plans. For all the talk about 
Japan’s societal need for defined benefit plans, an exodus of Japanese corporations fleeing a debilitating 
defined benefit framework for a less onerous defined contribution system can be taken as a given.” 
  Plan redesign is taking place against the context of important, if slow, changes in the Japanese 
labor market. Large employers are less committed to and less able to guarantee lifetime employment, 
unemployment is rising, and pension benefits are changing along with the rest of compensation. In 1999, 
Nissan Motors laid off 21,000 workers in an attempt to cut costs. Some companies, including Sumitomo 
Chemical, have even reduced retiree benefits; others curtailed prospective benefits by raising the 
retirement age from 60 to 65 (Anderson, 1999).  These changes signal massive changes in the Japanese 
labor market, previously marked by lifetime employment and extraordinarily low levels of joblessness. 
  Even with the economic troubles plaguing Japan’s macroeconomy, companies will still need to 
supply pensions, and employees will still demand pensions, for the same reasons they wanted them in the 
past.  It also seems clear that as new accounting standards increase corporate and pension system 
transparency, Japanese firms will be increasingly interested in capping liabilities for pension benefits and   28
severance pay. An alternative to reducing pension costs could be to flatten age/earnings profiles, and 
evidence suggests this is in fact starting to occur in Japan (Seike, 1997).  
  Informed opinion in Japan is extraordinarily divided regarding the likelihood of the DC plan 
model taking off in Japan. Some experts are very positive, arguing that the “scope of the DC market … 
(is) between US$193-770B” (Cornell 2001). By contrast, the US 401(k) market today amounts to over 
US$2.3 trillion.  Another positive view is Johnson’s (2001), which suggests that the total pension asset 
pool to be created by the new pension law is larger still, at US$777 billion. The bet here is that defined 
contribution assets will grow faster in Japan than current wisdom has it.”  Some 16% of 128 listed 
Japanese firms surveyed indicated they were actively considering introducing a DC plan, and only 18% 
indicated they had no intention of changing their plan type (Dow Jones, 1999). 
  A less optimistic assessment comes from Cerulli, which projects the DC market at only US$48 
billion over the next five years (Anderson, 1999). In fact, this influential research group has stated that 
“DC plans remain the biggest mirage in the Japanese asset management industry” (Cerulli 2001), because 
of their low contribution ceiling and the persistent underfunding problem makes it difficult for firms to 
exit their DB plans.  And of course the adoption of a DC plan, either solo or as a second-tier plan on top 
of a DB pension, will not alone solve the enormous underfunding problem associated with DB plans in 
Japan.  As noted by Matsuura (2000), “the shift is likely to take several decades.”   
   Some experts argue that instead of setting up DC plans, Japanese companies will move to cash 
balance plans because they are “better suited (than DC plans) for Japanese society…Many Japanese 
people like saving by using banks or the post office authority rather than investments such as bonds or 
equities, so many people will support cash balance plans (which don’t require investment decisions by the 
employee) rather than DC plans” (Feinberg 2001a). Others concur, noting that: “cash balance plans are 
between DB and DC plans and look better suited to the beginners” (Feinberg, 2001a). In addition, experts 
estimate that they may offer a guaranteed rate of return below the 4-5% currently assumed in DB plans, 
which should enhance their appeal to plan sponsors (Feinberg 2001a).    29
  On the surface, it may appear that the key factors that have spurred growth in the US cash-
balance and DC arena over the last decade are not central to Japanese conditions today.  Labor demand is 
far from robust; workers still do not change employers very frequently; traditional DB plans are 
underfunded; asset returns are low; and the new DC pensions do not have a particularly favorable tax 
environment.  And as we have shown, many questions remain to be answered, particularly regarding the 
DC plan blueprint.  Nevertheless, the fact that some major Japanese companies have already adopted DC 
plans presages greater momentum when the economy picks up again. If liberalized somewhat, the new 
pension models outlined by the 2001 legislation could provide Japanese savers an opportunity to diversify 
their investments so as to permit greater return with low risk. The recently enacted Japanese pension law 
will not turn all Japanese employer-sponsored pensions into 401(k)-style plans overnight, but it will make 
a contribution to modernizing the structure of Japanese compensation and retirement provision.  In sum, 
the 2001 legislation could well signal the beginning of a “Big Bang” transformation in pay, benefits, and 
mobility for the Japanese labor market, and change Japanese workers from “savers” into “investors.”    30
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Table 1. The Japanese Retirement Provision System: Old and New Structures 
 
The Pre-2001 Environment 
Non-Earnings Related Publicly-Run Retirement Plan 
National Pension Insurance (NPI):  
20 million self-employed members (“type 1 persons”);  
39 million private sector employees, civil servants, etc (type 2 members). 
12 million insured dependents (“type 3 members”);  
 
Earnings-Related Employer-Sponsored Partly Private, Partly Public Pension Plans 
Employee Pension Insurance (EPI):  
33 million members; covers all “type 2” members in private sector.  
Employee Pension Plans (EPF):  
12 million members; substitute for some EPI benefits and contributions  
Tax Qualified Pension Plans (TQPP):  
10 million members  
Lump Sum Severance Pay Plans:  
Covers 80% of enterprises (Japan Institute of Labor, 2000) 
Mutual Aid Associations:  




Personal Pension Plans 
Private Saving and Family Support 
 
Source: Derived from Conrad (2001) 
 
Changes Under 2001 Reforms  
Tier 1: Non-Earnings Related Publicly-Run Retirement Plan 
National Pension Scheme (NP): no change 
 
Tier 2:  Earnings-Related Employer-Sponsored Partly Private, Partly Public Pension Plans 
Employee Pension Insurance (EPI): No change 
Employee Pension Plans (EPF): Firms with DB may buy out of substitutional EPI component; 
new DC plans as well as DB plans to be permitted, possibly cash balance plans;  
Tax Qualified Pension Plans (TQPP): to be phased out over 10 years 
Mutual Aid Associations: No change. 
  
Tier 3: Personal Provision 
New Individual Pension to be permitted 
Personal Pension Plans: No change 
Private Saving and Family Support: No change 
 
Source: Derived from Sakamoto (2001)   35
Table 2. Estimated Real Value of Japanese DC Account Accumulation and Annual Benefit 




Years of  Retirement 
Annuitized Single 
Life Value 
Saving  Accumulation  Men  Women 
10  $36,618  $2,497  $1,904 
20  $77,067  $5,255  $4,008 
30  $121,747  $8,301  $6,331 
        
 
Source: Authors’ computations. 
Notes: Assumes maximum contribution of US$3,500 (real) per year; 1% real rate of return on 
assets pre and post retirement; no mortality prior to retirement; no investment fees or insurance 
loading; single-life annuity; and EPF (sex-specific) tables after retirement at age 65. 
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Table 3: Features of US Employer-Sponsored Retirement Plans 
 
  Defined  Defined  Cash  Cash Balance 
Plan feature  Benefit plan  Contribution plan  Balance plan   Tendency 
         
Employer 
contributes 
Virtually always  Sometimes  Virtually 
always 
DB 
Employee   
contributes 
Very rarely  Virtually always  Very rarely  DB 
Participation  Automatic  Employee choice  Automatic  DB 
Contribution level  Automatic  Employee choice  Automatic  DB 
PBGC Insurance  Yes but capped  Not needed  Yes but capped  DB 
Early departure 
penalty 
Yes  No  No  DC 
Benefits easily 
portable 
No  Yes  Yes  DC 
Annual 
communication 
Benefit at end of 
career 
Current balance  Current balance  DC 
Retirement 
incentives 
Occur at specific 
ages 





Loaded to career 
end 





Employer bears  Employee bears  Shared  Mixed 
Longevity 
insurance 
Typically yes  Typically no  Not often taken  Mixed 
 
 
Source: Clark, Haley, and Schieber (2001) 
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Figure 2: Value of Accrued Pension Benefit as a Multiple of Annual Wage at Various Ages for a 
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Source: Clark and Schieber (2001 forthcoming). 
 
 
 